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Recent Amendments to China's Patent 
Law: The Emperor's New Clothes? 
As an economically developing country, the People's Republic of 
China1 recognizes that technological innovation and industrial ex-
pansion are critical to maintaining internal political control and 
sovereignty.2 This Note focuses on China's efforts to increase foreign 
investment and technology transfer through the mechanism of in-
tellectual property law.3 Using the evolution of one of its laws pro-
tecting intellectual property-the Patent Law-this Note explores 
China's movement away from the Macrera's nonrecognition of prop-
erty rights and economic development towards the current realpoli-
tik accommodations between China's socialist political system and 
its developing market economy. As one commentator aptly stated: 
The concept of individuals holding exclusive rights in an 
article of intellectual property, as well as the "money-seek-
ing" tendencies and excessive individualism such rights 
might foster, are troublesome for a society with a tradition-
ally low tolerance for rapacious profit-seeking and a long 
political tradition favouring state control over individual 
enterprise.4 
I "China" or "PRC" is used hereinafter to refer to the People's Republic of China as 
distinguished from the Republic of China (Taiwan). 
2 For example, the flow of goods, services, and personnel between Hong Kong and the 
adjacent province of Guangdong has had a marked effect on the internal politics of this 
province and has allowed it to develop a semi-autonomous relationship with the central 
government in Beijing.JOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA A NEW HISTORY 416-17 (1992); see also 
China's Legislature Approves Membership in Two Copyright Conventions, PATENT, TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA) , July 8,1992, available in WESTlAW, BNA-PTD File (reporting 
that the Standing Committee recently granted the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone legal 
autonomy) [hereinafter Conventions]. China's opening up to the West and economic reforms 
have created tensions among the Chinese populace and directly influenced cases of internal 
unrest such as the recent demonstration and military intervention in Tiananmen Square. See 
FAIRBANK, supra at 421-23. 
3 The following doctrines are recognized commonly as protecting intellectual property: 
trademark, patent law, copyright, trade secret law, and unfair competition. See generally PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES (3d ed. 1990). 
4 Brian Barron, Chinese Patent Legislation in Cultural and Historical Perspective, 6 INTELL. 
PROP. J. 313, 330 (1991). 
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How socialist China has embraced the capitalist precepts of proprie-
tary interests while facially maintaining its tradition of collective 
ownership is an important insight to its treatment of intellectual 
property law. 
Part I of this Note briefly describes the economic model that 
underlies the utility of intellectual property protection and summa-
rizes the inherent dysfunction between the theoretical model and 
China's cultural and political environment. Part II reviews the origi-
nal5 Patent Law of the PRC6 enacted in 1984, the Law's economic 
effects in China, and reported defects in the Law. Part III compares 
the recent Amendments to the original Patent Law approved by the 
State Council in October 19927 and to the modifications of the Law 
agreed to by the Chinese in early 1992.8 The Note concludes that 
although some defects remain in the Patent Law, the Amendments 
provide substantive remedies to many outstanding problems and 
most likely will bolster the PRC's goal of encouraging foreign trade 
and investment. 
More subtly, the decision to enact major amendments to the 
Patent Law, comporting closely to an accord reached with the 
United States in January 1992,9 reflects the determination of the 
Chinese leadership to increase the confidence level of foreign inves-
tors and mirrors their recognition that vigorous protection of intel-
lectual property is integral to China's ongoing economic develop-
5 All references to Chinese legal documents in this Note, such as the Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China, the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, and the 
Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law, are taken from English-language secondary 
sources. Note that the official Chinese-language documents are the authoritative versions of 
these legal documents. 
6 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the 6th Nat'l People's Cong., 
4th Sess. of the Standing Comm., Mar. 12, 1984), translated in 2 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN 
BUSINESS, CHINA TRADE DOCUMENTS" 11-600 (CCH Australia 1989) [hereinafter Patent 
Law). The Patent Law became effective on April 1, 1985. Id. 
7 Resolution on A mending the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted Uy the 27th 
Sess. of the 7th Nat. People's Cang. Standing Comm., Sept. 4, 1992), Vroadcast Uy Xinhua (China 
News Agency), translated in SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS (Brit. Broadcasting Corp.), 
Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File [hereinafter Amendments). 
8 As described in a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR). See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America on the 
Protection of Intellectual Property,Jan. 17, 1992, U.S.-China (Dep't St. document on file with 
the B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV.) [hereinafter MOU). Note that the text of the MOU appears 
in Appendix A. 
9Id. The agreement was the result of negotiations triggered by an investigation by the USTR 
into unfair trade practices and piracy of technology by the Chinese. See infra part II, sec. D. 
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ment plans. 10 China clearly wants to compete on an equal footing in 
the world trade arena, and thus has adopted the rules of the game 
by which the other players competeP 
The concerns of foreign investors that such significant changes in 
China's legal environment are a mere facade, or that a threat of 
nationalization or loss of rights remains, are misplaced; the benefits 
and political consequences stemming from the legal recognition of 
intellectual property rights are too entrenched to shed easily at this 
point. For example, in recent years, China has joined the Universal 
Copyright Convention, Berne Convention, Convention for the Pro-
tection of Phonograms, Madrid Agreement concerning the Regis-
tration of Trademarks, and the GATT Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement. As a continuing effort in this vein, China's latest amend-
ments to its Patent Law, spurred by U.S. complaints but not limited 
thereto, indicate a strong commitment to a capitalist market econ-
omy, regardless of the tensions12 these legal enhancements to pro-
prietary rights may create in the socialist political fabric. The Patent 
Law has been a lightning rod for change, whether planned or not. 
1. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS TO CHINA'S PATENT LAw 
Systems of intellectual property protection, such as patent and 
trademark laws, evolved as a complement to commerce.13 Ideas, 
10 See William E. Beaumont, The New Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC): 
Evidence of a Second Chinese "Renaissance"?, 27 IDEA 39, 39 (1988). 
11 See Jeannette L. Pinard, Patent Protection Under Chinese Law, 1 J. CHINESE L. 69, 90-91 
(1987). 
12 See Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People's Republic of China, 21 
TEx. INT'L LJ. 259, 280-82 (1986). The original debates in the 1950s between the socialists 
and the modernists whether a patent system was required at all colors any analysis of the 
current law. Id. The collective ownership principle of socialism suggests that monetary awards 
rather than proprietary interests would be sufficient to stimulate innovation, while those 
parties interested in industrial modernization believed Western-style property rights were 
critically important. Id. The modernists are ultimately winning that debate; however, the 
language of even recent discussions is still colored with socialist terminology. Currently, the 
Chinese are planning to revise their constitution further to provide even strong~r legal 
protection for market-oriented reforms. David Holley, China to Alter Constitution to Boost Free 
Market, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1993, at 2. The amendment reportedly strengthens the 
legitimacy of private enterprise and reinforces the trend of free market competition between 
state-owned enterprises and private entities (which the amendment refers to as the basis for 
the "socialist market economy"). Id. 
13 See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 1-2. As one commentator of China's Patent Law noted, 
"mental labor, like manual labor, can create value. Inventions and creations, as products of 
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inventions, and symbolic representations such as logos indicating 
the source or quality of goods, possess value to buyers and sellers 
alike; however, in the abstract, these items are inherently intangible 
and endlessly divisible. 14 In other words, anyone can "take" an idea 
without causing a physical diminution of the inventor's property.I5 
Prior to the establishment of intellectual property laws, inventors 
faced the problem of appropriating their ideas or inventions for 
their exclusive use, because absent legal property rights, inventors 
could not exclude others from misappropriating their ideas. 16 Be-
cause ideas and inventions have little value in commerce if the 
public can replicate them freely, intellectual property laws play a 
critical role in providing economic incentives for the development 
and disclosure of novel creationsP A patent law, for example, en-
courages inventors to expend resources to develop useful new ideas 
and to disclose their novel inventions, in return for the grant of 
near-monopolistic power for a limited time to provide a return on 
investmen t. IS 
Patent laws compound the economic and social benefits by pro-
viding a similar incentive for future potential inventors and by at-
tracting private investment capital for development and marketing 
of novel creations.19 Society also accrues additional benefits during 
the exclusive patent term which might otherwise be absent, such as 
the ability to use the invention.20 Finally, the relatively short duration 
of the exclusive term-generally seventeen years-means that the 
invention passes into the public domain at the end of the patent 
period.21 
Modern patent systems in developed countries, such as the United 
States and the European nations, encounter relatively little opposi-
mental labor, are commodities." Liwei Wang, Political and Cultural Perspectives of the PRC 
Patent Law: The Role of Article 14, 6 WIS. INT'L LJ. 193,206 (1988). 




181d. at 358. 
19 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 10 (quoting Report of the President's Commission on the Patent 
System 1-3 (1966)). 
20 For example, other interested parties may license the invention, spreading its value to 
society more widely than a single entity could. In addition, the published specifications allow 
other inventors to use the patent as a springboard for experimentation and further innova-
tion. ld. at 11. 
211d. at 10-11. 
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tion on either theoretical or practical grounds.22 The ever-accelerat-
ing pace of technology over the past century appears to support the 
basic economic concept that intellectual property protection stimu-
lates innovation. The proof is in the products, so to speak. The 
situation in developing countries, however, can be quite different 
because of a strong national interest in protecting embryonic indus-
tries from outside competition and preventing excessive foreign 
ownership and control of critical industries like steel, chemicals, or 
pharmaceuticals.23 As a newly developing country with a Marxist, 
non-market legacy, the road China has taken historically regarding 
intellectual property rights provides a useful backdrop to further 
analysis of its patent law.24 
China's civilization stretches back over 10,000 years,25 during 
which time China was often far ahead of other cultures in terms of 
scientific and technological advances.26 The Chinese are credited 
with such notable innovations as gunpowder, paper, and the com-
pass, but certain cultural tendencies led the Chinese to forego com-
mercialization of such inventions.27 Significantly, the prevalence of 
22 See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTEllECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1-7 
(1990). 
23 Sidel, supra note 12, at 282; Beaumont, supra note 10, at 50. Sherwood advances a strong 
recommendation that developing countries should adopt full-fledged legal systems for pro-
tecting intellectual property, on a par with developed countries. See SHERWOOD, supra note 
22, at 2,8. There is much controversy, however, especially among economists of lesser-devel-
oped countries, that intellectual property laws are merely a ploy by developed countries. These 
economists argue that patents, trademarks and the like merely act to suppress innovation 
within the developing country and provide developed countries with a built-in trade advan-
tage. Id. at 1-2. These arguments are relevant to China's Patent Law, which until recently was 
like other lesser-developed countries in that it did not provide patent protection for pharma-
ceuticals. Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 25. Although China acceded to the United States 
Trade Representative and amended its Patent Law to recognize drug and food patents, one 
could argue that a developing country will spend too much of its foreign capital on advanced 
pharmaceuticals at high monopoly prices, when it could make them for less or at least sell 
them at a lower price than that charged by the patent holder. But cf. SHERWOOD, supra note 
22, at 159-70 (questioning lower cost and lack of local development arguments). 
24 See Note, Copyright Relatians Between the US and the PRe: An Interim Report, 10 BROOK. 
J. INT'L L. 403,410 (1984) [hereinafter "Interim Report"]. As the author pointed out, "No 
examination of the principles governing the protection and dissemination of intellectual 
property in the PRC would be complete without first recognizing the enourmous influence 
of Marxist-Leninist theories of law and property on the existing political and economic system 
of the PRC." Id. 
25FAIRBANK, supra note 2, at 3l. 
26Id. at 2-3. 
27Id. In the Middle Ages (1000-1500 A.D.) for example, China was well ahead of Europe 
in technology and industrial applications. Id. A feudal, rice-based economy, and the natural 
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Confucian thinking, which stresses personal development rather 
than personal reward, influenced the institution of a different sys-
tem of incentives for invention and ingenuity than legal protection.28 
The European cultures established the legal doctrine of property 
rights in ideas and granted a monopoly to the inventor as an eco-
nomic incentive for others to innovate.29 The Chinese, on the other 
hand, adopted a monetary awards and public recognition approach.30 
Confucian ideology and China's traditional aversion to individual 
profiteering fit neatly with the precepts of the Marxist economic 
system that took hold in 1949 by providing a cultural basis for the 
preeminence of state interests over individual autonomy.31 Thus, the 
PRC's first modern Patent Law in 1950, and subsequent enabling 
rules such as the 1963 Regulations on Inventions, rewarded inven-
tors with minor prizes, but mandated ownership of novel inven-
tions in the State.32 During the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1975, 
Mao's imposition of strict Marxist principles eliminated even these 
small awards and recognitions to emphasize the subordination of 
the individual to the State.33 
north-south geographical and climatic divisions influenced the lack of commercialization of 
technology. FAIRBANK, supra note 2, at 3-5, 15-16; see also Beaumont, supra note 10, at 42. 
Beaumont makes the point that the Chinese always recognized the value of technical progress, 
but admits that many notable inventions had little impact on the culture and economy. 
Beaumont, supra note 10, at 43. 
28 See Barron, supra note 4, at 330; Beaumont, supra note 10, at 44 (citing]. GERNET, A 
HISTORY OF CHINESE CIVIliZATION 573 (1985». 
29 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 358; see generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN 
PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAw (1967). 
30 Barron, supra note 4, at 326-27; see also Beaumont, supra note 10, at 46. 
31 Barron, supra note 4, at 314; Beaumont, supra note 10, at 44. 
32 Provisional Regulations on the Protection of the Invention Right and the Patent Right 
(1950) cited in Wang, supra note 13, at 194 n.1 (citing 1 FAliNG HUBIAN 359 (1952». An 
excellent chronological collection of the laws and regulations relating to patent rights prior 
to the enactment of the 1984 Patent Law appears in Wang's article. [d. 
33Beaumont, supra note 10, at 45-46; Sidel, supra note 12, at 281. Mao held a hard line 
throughout his reign emphasizing that since all property belongs to the State, even if ideas 
are property, no person can own them, and any legal principle assigning individual ownership 
was ideologically unacceptable. See Beaumont, supra note 10, at 45-46. In general, the 
ideological perspective of the Mao era, especially during the preeminence of the Red Guard 
in the Cultural Revolution period, was anti-foreign, anti-development, and inward-looking. See 
FAIRBANK, supra note 2, at 395 (characterizing the Cultural Revolution as "anti-intellectualism 
accompanied by xenophobia"); Ross]. Oehler, Comment, Patent Law in the People's Republic 
of China: A Primer, 8 N.Y.L. SCH.]' INT'L & COMPo L. 451, 452 (1987); see also Barron, supra 
note 4, at 327. 
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Mter the overthrow of the "Gang of Four" in 197634 and the 
establishment of the Four Modernizations,35 China's leadership 
changed its focus to encourage economic and industrial develop-
ment and began a period of reform.36 One element of the overall 
economic reform drive was an "Open Door" policy, which led to the 
passage of many new laws,37 including measures to protect intellec-
tual property consistently with laws of other nations. These reforms 
were intended to provide international investors with a level of 
confidence that their industrial products and processes would not 
be misappropriated by unscrupulous locals.38 
Economic reform in any culture is generally not without political 
ramifications; China's experience has been no exception.39 Not un-
expectedly, China's internal modernization program raised expec-
tations and created social tensions, which were elevated to a greater 
level because of the inherent conflict between burgeoning capitalist 
economic measures and the existing socialist political fabric.40 The 
drive to industrialize required sending tens of thousands of Chinese 
to foreign universities, and enlisting the support of the established 
scientific intelligentsia.41 Moreover, rapid advances in communica-
tions technology allowed direct contact between Chinese scientists 
34Wang, supra note 13, at 195. The Gang of Four, as they were colloquially known, assumed 
power after Mao's death. The group included Mao's widow and three of her cohorts in the 
Central Cultural Revolution Group. FAIRBANK, supra note 2, at 387. 
35 XIANFA (Constitution of the People's Republic of China) (1982), translated in 2 CHINA 
LAws FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, CHINA TRADE DOCUMENTS, 'lI 4-500 (CCH Australia 1989). The 
"Four Modernizations" are development of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and 
national defense, which the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China decided should take precedence over the prior governments' 
emphasis on politics. Wang, supra note 13, at 202. 
36Beaumont, supra note 10, at 39; Wang, supra note 13, at 202; Sidel, supra note 12, at 281. 
37 FAIRBANK, supra note 2, at 417. One example is the Economic Contract Law, enacted in 
1981. Barron, supra note 4, at 328. 
38 Oehler, supra note 33, at 455; Wang, supra note 13, at 215-16. Wang quotes a Chinese 
legal scholar who surmised that the Patent Law was enacted 'Just for the sake offoreign patent 
holders." Wang, supra note 13, at 215-16 (citing Zheng, The System of Intellectual Property and 
Our Country's Intellectual Property, 4 ZHONGGUO FAXE (The Science of Chinese Law) 169 
(1984) ). 
39 Indeed, one commentator describes intellectual property protection in China as a "basic 
theoretical dilemma" for socialism. David Ben Kay, The Patent Law of the PRe in Perspective, 
33 UCLA L. REv. 331, 342 (1985). 
40 One rationale for Tiananmen Square was the dichotomy between the relaxation of 
economic controls and the continued policing of nascent political expression. As Professor 
Fairbank states, "a market economy implied a free marketplace of ideas." FAIRBANK, supra 
note 2, at 421-22. 
41Id. at 407. 
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and the international academic community, not to mention a flood 
of Western journalism and advertising, which placed the control-ori-
ented Central Government under an international microscope.42 
Such exchanges invited negative comparisons by Chinese citi-
zens between themselves and their more economically well-off Asian 
neighbors. Overall, China's growing pains have been similar to those 
of other developing countries where emerging socioeconomic 
classes begin seeking political empowerment. As one noted historian 
explained, "[w]hen a billion people 'take off into industrialization, 
their economic growth cannot be prevented by the government. 
The question for rulers is how to achieve a complementary growth 
of the political system. "43 
In addition to limited political and social accommodations44 relat-
ing to modernization and development, China also has had to make 
difficult decisions about economic policies. Given the threat of pos-
sible challenges to its sovereignty,45 and the need to upgrade its in-
dustrial infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities, China lacked 
the luxury of spurring economic development solely by utilizing 
internal resources or strictly controlled foreign investment. Thus, 
since the "Four Modernizations"46 of 1976, China adopted a number 
of policies and modified its legal system to encourage foreign trade 
and investment.47 The Patent Law and its evolution since 1985 pro-
42 [d. at 422-23. Much of the world's information regarding events during and after Tianan-
men Square came from facsimile transmissions (faxes) sent by supporters of the students 
bypassing measures by the Central Government to suppress normal channels of news. Stu-
dents covertly faxed information about the events to overseas colleagues. Television broadcasts 
captured the world's attention, including one dramatic picture of a lone student halting a 
column of tanks. [d. at 301 (photograph insert opposite page). 
43 [d. at 406. 
44 Such accommodations include privatization of previously state-owned factories, limited 
free enterprise endeavors by private citizens, and increased scientific and academic exchanges. 
See id. at 407, 411, 415. 
45 Other countries in southeast Asia have demonstrated an increasing trend to arm them-
selves, which their economic prowess makes possible. For example, Taiwan's recently com-
pleted deal with the United States to purchase advanced F-16 fighter aircraft caused a near 
breakdown in diplomatic relations between China and the United States. See Zhang Xiaodong, 
US jet Sales Denounced Worldwide, BEIJING REv., Sept. 21-27, 1992, at 15. 
46The "Four Modernizations" as they are known colloquially, derive from language in the 
Preface to the 1982 Amendment to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. See 
supra note 35. 
47 See Beaumont, supra note 10, at 40. The Foreign Economic Contract Law, which became 
effective July 1, 1985, is one example. DONG SHIZHONG ET AL, TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA 93 (1992). This law has been instrumental to the development of 
the capitalist market within China by providing a legal basis for joint ventures between foreign 
and domestic entities and collateralized loans from foreign banks. [d. at 95. 
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vide an illuminating example of how legal innovation engenders 
poli tical accommodation.48 
II. CHINA's ORIGINAL PATENT LAw 
The Chinese leaders of the late 1970s and early 1980s who sup-
ported the goals of the Four Modernizations clearly recognized the 
utility of intellectual property protection as an incentive for eco-
nomic development, as the first article of the Patent Law indicates.49 
Between 1980 and 1983, China sent dozens of envoys with legal, 
scientific, and political backgrounds to study extensively the patent 
laws and practices of various developed countries. 50 As a result, the 
Patent Law eventually enacted in China contained many features 
common to established patent laws in developed countries.51 
In 1984, China passed a patent law that facially extended a level 
of protection to foreign patent holders similar to that of other 
internationally-accepted models.52 Yet, complaints by U.S. patentees 
and other foreign patent holders of piracy and infringement by the 
Chinese continued through the 1980s.53 In addition, China's admin-
istrative and judicial enforcement was relatively inexperienced. 54 In 
48 Although, as Professor Fairbank points out, mere industrial reforms cannot be called the 
"revival of capitalism, since the party and the state still called the tune and remained devoted 
to collectivism, that is, socialism." FAIRBANK, supra note 2, at 414. 
49 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 1. Article 1 reads as follows: "[t]his Law is enacted to protect 
patent rights for inventions-creations, to encourage invention-<:reation, to foster the spreading 
and applications of inventions-creations, and to promote the development of science and 
technology, for meeting the needs of the construction of socialist modernization." Id. Zhou 
En-Lai was the foremost proponent of the Four Modernizations, but was blocked from 
implementing them by Mao during the Cultural Revolution. FAIRBANK, supra note 2, at 404; 
Beaumont, supra note 10, at 40. It was not until after the deaths of Zhou and Mao in 1976, 
and the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping, that the Four Modernizations were officially adopted 
by the Central Government Id. 
50 Lionel S. Sobel, Technology Transfer and Protection of Intellectual Property in China, 12 Loy. 
L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 61, 63 (1989). Among the nations visited were Canada, the United 
States, and European Community members. Sidel, supra note 12, at 282; Oehler, supra note 
33, at 455. 
51 Sobel, supra note 50, at 63. 
52 The Chinese borrowed primarily from the patent laws of the United States, Germany and 
Canada. Oehler, supra note 33, at 456 (finding that the "[Chinese] Patent Law ... does not 
differ drastically from United States Patent Law or that of the Paris Convention members."). 
Id. 
53 See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
54 Pinard, supra note 11, at 85; Wang, supra note 13, at 220-23. But if. PATENT, 'TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT LAw DAILY (BNA) , Apr. 16, 1992, availahle in WESTLAW, BNA-PTD File 
(indicating that few cases reach the Chinese courts and that administrative solutions to 
disputes are swift and effective). 
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December 1991, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
responded to these complaints by instituting a Section 301 investi-
gation of China's trade practices pursuant to the 1974 Trade Act.55 
Mter threats of sanctions by the USTR, China agreed to tighten up 
its intellectual property protection, and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) in January 1992 with the USTR.56In Septem-
ber 1992, the State Council approved an amendment to the Patent 
Law to address the complaints of foreign businesses and respond to 
its pledge as outlined in the MOU.57 
A. Beginning Steps to Intellectual Property Protection 
The first law protecting intellectual property after the Four Mod-
ernizations was the Trademark Law, adopted in 1983.58 This law 
constituted a logical first step in dismantling China's isolationist 
policies.59 In addition to enacting a Trademark Law, China took 
several other steps signifying its intention to meet international 
standards of intellectual property protection. In 1983, China joined 
the World Intellectual Property Organization, and signed the Paris 
Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial Property in 1984.60 
The State Council approved the original Patent Law on March 12, 
1984.61 The stated purpose of the Patent Law was to facilitate foreign 
exchange, trade, and investment; stimulate and protect domestic 
55 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c) (1988). The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat 1107 (codified in various sections of 19 U.S.C.), made sig-
nificant amendments to the Trade Act of 1974. "Section 301" refers to sections 301-309 as 
amended in 1988. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2066 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2487 (1988 
& Supp. 1990». Section 301 actions allow the U.S. Trade Representative to impose severe 
sanctions in the form of greatly increased tariffs on countries found to violate trade practices. 
56 See generally MOU, supra note 8. 
57 See generally Amendments, supra note 7. 
58 Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the 5th Nat'l People's 
Cong., 24th Sess. of the Standing Comm., Aug. 23, 1982), translated in 2 CHINA LAWS FOR 
FOREIGN BUSINESS, CHINA TRADE DOCUMENTS' 11-500 (CCH Australia 1989). 
59 Joint ventures and capital investment typically require more preliminary investigation into 
logistical and financial matters as well as a foreign presence or organization in China. In 
contrast, importation merely requires a shipping destination, financing, and a level of 
confidence by the manufacturer that the product shipped under the mark is the product sold 
under the mark. A product or service mark is a symbol, word, design or even color that clearly 
distinguishes one producer's goods from similar goods by another producer. Infringing on a 
mark by copying it to pass of one's goods as another's or diluting the strength of a mark by 
reusing it in a similar or different context are issues of trademark and unfair competition law. 
See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 354-55. 
6OPinard, supra note 11, at 69. 
61 Patent Law, supra note 6. 
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scientific research; encourage the introduction and use of new in-
ventions; and bolster the socialist economy. 52 A Party spokesman 
described the Patent Law as an effort to encourage the "enthusiasm, 
creativity and inventiveness of the whole people."53 Thus, China 
explicitly recognized that the grant of property rights could foster 
internal development by providing economic incentives to citizens.54 
Later announcements by the Party discussed the further goals of the 
Patent Law's grant of limited monopolies to domestic and foreign 
patentees to encourage international investment and disclosure of 
advanced technologies.55 
The Patent Law is divided into eight chapters of sixty-nine articles. 
Chapter I establishes the general provisions, such as the protection 
of invention-creations,55 the establishment of a patent office,57 a first-
to-file doctrine,58 rights of assignment,59 exclusive use70 and fees,71 
62 Id.; see supra note 49 for the text of article 1. 
63 Daily Report China, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERVICE, No. 136 at k9, July 13, 1984, 
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, A1lasi File. 
64Id. Curiously, remnants of the Pre-Mao era awards system still appear to be in use, 
suggesting that the 1963 Regulations on Inventions still retain force of law. One semi-official 
newsmagazine reported the granting of rewards for outstanding inventors such as $36,000 
and a Audi automobile in addition to a patent. Handsome Rewards for Crackerjack Inventors, 
BEIJING REv., Aug. 10-16, 1992, at 9. 
65See Sidel, supra note 12, at 282 (quoting a speech by RenJianxin, Director, Legal Affairs 
Department, China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, and Vice President, 
Supreme People's Court, to the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, in Hong Kong on 
September 29,1980 (citations omitted». In general, however, few commentaries appear to 
have been made by Chinese officials regarding the effects of the Patent Law on the social 
fabric, or what sorts of political accommodations would be necessary to handle the new 
socioeconomic classes of industrialists and petit bourgeoisie that inevitably would emerge as 
individuals and corporations were empowered with the means of production and capital 
accumulation. 
66 Invention-creations are defined as "inventions, utility models, and designs." Patent Law, 
supra note 6, art. 2. Utility models are defined as "minor technical and production improve-
ments" and receive a shorter patent period (five years). Id. art. 45; Beaumont, supra note 10, 
at 49. 
67 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 3. 
68Id. art. 9. Compare China's first-to-file provision with the U.S. Patent Law, which provides 
that "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... (g) before the applicant's invention 
thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed it." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988). China's first-to-file approach is far more 
typical; only the United States and the Philippines follow a first-to-invent system. GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 3, at 402. Professor Goldstein indicates that one reason the United States has 
opposed the first-to-file approach is a concern among some that a first-to-invent system 
protects against the theft of patents by those who would devote resources to early filing rather 
than invention. Id. 
69 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 10. 
70 !d. art. 11. 
7l Id. art. 12. 
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marking rights,72 and a provision that the Patent Office shall main-
tain the secrecy of applications prior to publication.73 
Several articles within Chapter I relating to State control over 
foreign patentees have caused concern among international inves-
tors. For example, the State has the power to keep applications 
relating to the vital interests or security of the State secret. 74 In 
addition, article 14 empowers the State to appropriate and exploit 
any patent of a "Chinese individual or entity under collective own-
ership, which is of great significance to the in terests of the state or to 
public interest."75 These initial concerns have proved unwarranted, 
however, as no such actions have occurred to date.76 Indeed, provi-
sions such as article 18, which mandate the treatment of foreign 
applications pursuant to any bilateral or multilateral agreements to 
which China and the foreign applicant's country are a party,77 may 
have been intended to assuage concerns of foreign investors raised 
by article 14. For example, the priority of foreign applicants who 
had filed up to one year earlier in a member country recognized by 
the Paris Convention would apply in China.78 
Chapter II establishes the requirements for the grant of a patent 
right, following closely the U.S. Patent Law.79 Thus, an invention or 
utility model must posses "novelty, inventiveness and practical appli-
cability."80 The Patent Law also provides a statutory bar for prior use 
of an identical invention if used or published in China or abroad 
before the application filing date and no retroactive patents are 
granted for inventions patented abroad before the Patent Law be-
72Id. art. 15. 
73 Id. art. 21. 
74 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 4. 
75 Id. art. 14. Note that article 14, which has come under severe attack as a veiled compulsory 
licensing clause that threatens foreign investors, was not modified at all in the recent amend-
ments, while the official Compulsory Licensing Chapter (articles 51-66) was significantly 
modified as agreed in the MOU of Jan. 17, 1992. See infra, notes 209-221 and accompanying 
text; see also Pinard, supra note 11, at 80-81. 
76 Revised Patent Law Will Enter Into Force January 1, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 
LAW DAILY (BNA), Oct. 26, 1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA-PTD File [hereinafter Lulinl. 
Gao Lulin, Director General of the Chinese Patent Office is quoted as saying "The Chinese 
government is very earnest about protecting the patentee. In the past seven years China did 
not grant any compulsory licenses. This is proof." Id. 
77 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 18; see also Pinard, supra note 11, at 81. 
78 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 29. 
79 Cj 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1988) (describing the statutory requirements for novelty, 
utility, and non-obviousness). 
80 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 22. A utility model is a term of art signifying a minor 
invention. See supra note 66. 
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came effective81 (thus barring thousands of existing products from 
obtaining Chinese patents), Certain classes of items were not eligible 
for patents under the original law, such as foods, beverages, flavor-
ings, pharmaceutical products, substances made by chemical proc-
ess, or animal and plant varieties (bioengineered hybrids) .82 Chap-
ters III-VIII deal with the application process;83 examination and 
approval of patent applications;84 the duration, cessation and invali-
dation of patent rights;85 compulsory licensing;86 protection of the 
patent right;87 and supplementary provisions.88 
B. Economic Effects 
The economic impact of the Patent Law has been impressive, at 
least on a relative scale.89 The Patent Office has reported significant 
numbers of patent applications, which have increased in volume 
each year since 1985.90 Foreign investment also has increased dra-
81 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 23; Oehler, supra note 33, at 461. Compare the statutory 
bars in the U.S. Patent Act, which states: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention 
thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior 
to the date of the application for patent in the United States .... 
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (b) (1988). 
82 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 25. 
83Id. arts. 26-33. 
84Id. arts. 34-44. 
85 ld. arts. 45-50. 
86Id. arts. 51-58. 
87 Patent Law, supra note 6, arts. 59-66. 
88Id. arts. 67-69. The Supplementary Provisions include the requirement for a fee, notice 
that the Patent Office would be promulgating Implementing Regulations, and the effective 
date of the Patent Law. Id. 
89 The overall quantity of internal and external patent applications is small when compared 
to China's population and the number of applications filed annually by developed countries. 
In isolation, however, China's statistics on the pace of invention demonstrate impressive gains 
given the short time that the Patent Law has been in force. 
90 China Ameruis Patent Law, BEIJING REv., July 13-19, 1992, at 11-12. Internal patent 
applications totaled more than 230,000 from 1985 to 1992, approximately 30,000 of which 
were from foreign entities during the same period. Id. at 12. Of these applications, the Patent 
Office examined and approved approximately 100,000 patents. Id. In 1991,45,395 domestic 
and 4,645 foreign patent applications were filed, with 1,620 of the latter from U.S. entities. 
Statistics Show Sharp Increase in Patent, Trademark Applications, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COpy-
RIGHT LAw DAILY (BNA) , June 2,1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA-PTD File. 
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matically since 1985.91 The exact economic impact of the Patent Law 
is, of course, impossible to measure.92 Since 1985, however, China's 
trade with the rest of the world has increased to more than $50 
billion and the Chinese economy currently is expanding at 12 per-
cent annually.93 Indeed, somewhat to the consternation of the 
United States, China's bilateral trade surplus in 1990 stood at $10.4 
billion, and was expected to rise to more than $13 billion in 199J.94 
In summary, the Patent Law, despite alleged shortcomings,95 seems 
not to have discouraged foreign investment and technology transfer. 
Questions remain, however, about unreported infringements and 
lost sales beyond the knowledge of the patent holders.96 
C. Structural Dejects of the Original Patent Law 
Beginning prior to the passage of the Patent Law and continuing 
to date, numerous scholarly articles have been written on the his-
torical, social, and political dynamics of the Patent Law,97 its struc-
tural defects and ambiguities,98 and concerns of international inves-
91 For example, Amgen, a leading U.S. biotechnology firm, plans to market its flagship 
product Epogen directly to China and has received a Chinese patent. Robin Herman, One 
Patented Gene's Astounding Success StIYTY, WASH. POST, June 16, 1992, at Z14. In addition, 
during a recent trip to China, the General Manager of DuPont announced that the company 
is interested in transferring advanced chemical technology to seventeen Chinese chemical 
companies. DuPont Settles into Chinese Market, BEIJING REV., Sept. 14-20, 1992, at 39. 
92 The difficulties of measurement and assignment are further complicated by the extraor-
dinary growth of the Chinese economy since 19S5. China's 1992 GDP Increases by 12%, 
BEIJING REV., Jan. 11-17, 1993, at 5. This increase may be deceiving because of pent up 
demand for industrial and consumer products within China and the onrush of investors to 
whom patent protection is not relevant. 
93Id. The export value of industrial output from the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 
which increased from $11 million in the early 19S0s to approximately $3 billion in the early 
1990s, is a striking example of the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy. DONG, supra 
note 47, at 17. 
94 George White, opening Up China's Trade Market Apt to be Hard, L.A. TIMEs,Jan. 20, 1992, 
at 2. 
95 See infra part II, sec. C. 
96Patentees in China do seem to have been able to press their infringement claims with 
some level of success, however. Chinese Intellectual Property System FlYTmed, XINHUA (China 
News Agency), Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Xinhua File (reporting that 
over 2,500 patent disputes have been handled by China's courts in the last seven years [albeit 
with limited reporting of the parties or outcomes]). 
97 See, e.g., Barron, supra note 4; Beaumont, supra note 10; Wang, supra note 13; Janiece 
Marshall, Current Developments in the People's Republic of China: Has China Changed?, 1 
TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (19SS). 
98 See, e.g., Robert C.H. Lee, China's New Technology Import Regulations, 5 CHINA L. REP. 27 
(1990); Hong liu &Jun Wei, Technology Transfer to China: The Patent System, 5 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 363 (19S9); P.D. Woods, Trademark and Patent Law in the 
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torS.99 Generally, these defects can be categorized as subject matter 
limitations, process issues, excessive powers retained by the govern-
ment, and enforcement difficulties. 
1. Subject Matter Concerns 
The original Patent Law sharply restricted the patentability of 
chemical products and pharmaceuticals in that only processes, but 
not products themselves, could receive patents. IOO This restriction 
was particularly problematic to parties wishing to import agricultural 
chemical products. lOl In addition, the Patent Law barred Chinese 
patents for inventions that already had been described in print or 
publicly used in another country prior to the application date in 
China, subject to the exceptions for priority filings provided by the 
bilateral treaty clause of article 18.102 
Although such a novelty requirement for patents is typical,103 the 
implication for foreign business entities was that they had to file in 
China first, or follow up with an application in China after filing in 
a Paris Convention member state within one year. 104 At the outset of 
the Patent Law, this procedure was both time-consuming and some-
what difficult given the inexperience of the Patent Office. l05 More-
over, foreigners have found China's internal laws relatively more dif-
ficult to employ than U.S. or European remedies. 106 Such difficulty 
Pecrple's Republic of China, 13 N.C. INT'L & COM. REG. 473 (1988); Liu Fengyun, Some Aspects 
of the Protection of Industrial Property in China, 4 CHINA L. REP. 155 (1987); Pinard, supra note 
11; Oehler, supra note 33. 
99 See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 50; Zhou Chuanjie, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in 
China, 12 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CaMP. LJ. 68 (1989); Thomas Mesevage, Note, The Carrot and 
the Stick: Protecting U. S. Intellectual Prcrperty in Develcrping Countries, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. LJ. 421 (1991). 
100 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 25. Many developing countries provide only limited patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals however, to encourage local industry to develop and advance. 
Beaumont, supra note lO, at 50; see also Marshall, supra note 97, at 52l. 
101 Sidel, supra note 12, at 284 (citing Eliasoph, China's Patent System Emerges, CHINA Bus. 
REv., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 51). 
102 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 29. 
103 See, e.g., 35 U .S.C. §§ lO2, 103 (1988). China's type of statutory bar on patentability has 
been termed "limited world novelty." Beaumont, supra note 10, at 52. 
104 Id. 
105Id. 
I06Pinard, supra note 11, at 85, 87. Chinese courts originally were quite unfamiliar with 
foreign business transactions and especially with the more complex permutations of patent 
law. Althoughjudges, attorneys, and officials of the Patent Office have been trained, the system 
had lacked the years of experience and solid body of case law that allows for speedy and 
accurate adjudication of disputes. Fortunately, disputes involving foreigners, such as patent 
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was probably due to foreigners' unfamiliarity with China's legal 
system and courts, and the somewhat ill-equipped state of the judi-
cial system in China, which had been disman tled during the Cultural 
Revolution. 107 
A further problem was that, under article 2 of the Patent Law, a 
holder of a Chinese patent had no recourse legally if another person 
manufactured the patented product within a country where the 
patent holder did not have a patent and then imported the product 
to China. lOS Finally, the lack of trade secret laws in China basically 
forced foreigners who wished to protect their products to apply for 
a patent.109 
2. Process Issues 
Procedural criticisms begin with ambiguities in wording. llo For 
example, the Patent Law defines "foreign applicants" as persons with 
no habitual residence or place of business in China, but neither 
residence nor place of business is specified in the Patent Law or the 
Implementing Regulations. ll1 Such ambiguity leads to uncertainty 
among investors, especially joint venturers, who have a physical 
presence in China and often include transfer of their patented 
technology in the joint venture agreement. ll2 Based on this ambigu-
ity, the provisions of Chapter 14, regarding government appropria-
tion, might apply to foreign applicants if they are deemed domestic 
due to their partnerships with domestic entities.ll3 
Another problem was the distinction made in the Patent Law 
between a holder of a patent right and a full owner.ll4 The former 
received lesser rights, especially in terms of ownership and enforcing 
infringement actions. ll5 Furthermore, ajoint ownership agreement 
infringement actions, cannot be held in the lowest level courts (People's Courts), but are 
relegated to the higher Intermediate People's Courts. [d. at 88. 
107 [d. 
108Chuanjie, supra note 99, at 72. But see Amendments, supra note 7, art. 11 (infringing 
imports now prohibited). See infra note 177 for the language of Amendment 11. 
109 Pinard, supra note 11, at 78. But see MOU, supra note 8, art. 4 (requiring China to adopt 
trade secret protection). See infra note 124 for the language of the MOU. 
110 See liu, supra note 98, at 367. 
III Patent Law, supra note 6, arts. 18, 19; see also Implementing Regulations of the Patent 
Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in 2 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, 
CHINA TRADE DOCUMENTS ~ 11--603 (CCH Australia 1989). 
112 Pinard, supra note 11, at 79-81. 
113 [d.; see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
114Pinard, supra note 11, at 79. 
115 [d. 
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between a Chinese entity and a foreign investor where patents were 
transferred might trigger the distinction between a mere holder and 
a full owner and limit a foreign participant's patent rightsY6 
Another criticism was that the Patent Law adopts a first-to-file 
system, in contrast to a first-to-invent system. ll7 China's first-to-file 
approach, almost universally accepted by other countries,lls was es-
tablished to encourage inventions to enter the technology market 
"as early as possible."ll9 This provision could be criticized as a rule 
that may be appropriate for domestic Chinese inventors, but is 
inappropriate for foreigners given their lack of access to the Patent 
Office and the Chinese judicial system.120 Such criticism, however, 
is somewhat outdated, given the significant improvements in the 
staffing, training, and administration of the Patent Office since 
1985.121 
In addition, the practice of publishing patent applications before 
approval is granted has been sharply criticized because it fails to 
protect the applicant adequately.122 The Patent Law requires that 
patent applications be published in an Official Gazette (government 
publication) before the patent is approved to afford those who 
might wish to oppose the patent an opportunity to file a claim.123 
Thus, even though article 21 requires Patent Office officials to 
maintain the secrecy of the application before publication, publica-
tion in the Gazette will disclose the invention to the public before 
approval, which may be a problem if the patent application is denied 
or successfully opposed. 124 Moreover, all applications are first an-
116 [d. at 79, 81. 
117 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 9. 
118 All other countries with patent laws employ a first-to-file system except the United States 
and the Philippines. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 401-02. 
119 Fengyun, supra note 98, at 156. 
120 See supra note 106. 
121 [d. 
122 Liu, supra note 98, at 368. The Patent Office publishes an Official Gazette both to 
disclose the contents of approved patents to the public and to allow interested parties to 
contest pending applications for patents. The original 1984 Patent Law provided a three 
month period to challenge the application before the pending patent was approved officially. 
Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 41. 
123 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 41. 
124 [d. art. 34; see also Liu, supra note 98, at 368. Thus, the inventor whose application was 
denied lost the legal protection and economic benefit of retaining his invention as a trade 
secret, because China did not recognize trade secret law. Article 4 of the MOU, however, 
remedies this loophole with the following language: 
1. For the purpose of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as 
provided for in article 1 Obis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
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nounced for opposition during a three-month waiting period after 
initial approval of the patent, an administrative burden that creates 
inefficiency and an unnecessary delay in implementing the inven-
tion. The delay is consistent with the Patent Law to some extent 
however, because once a patent is granted, an infringer cannot 
challenge the validity of the patent in a counterclaim.125 
3. Powers Retained by the State. 
Another provision that has caused concern is the grant of power 
to the local governments to appropriate inventions. Pursuant to 
article 14, a Chinese governmental body can usurp or take owner-
ship of inventions deemed to possess great significance to the 
state. 126 Although this provision seems contrary to the right of sole 
possession typically given to patent holders by other legal systems, 127 
it is either a purposeful attempt to prevent warehousing of patents, 
which would undermine the aims of socialist modernization, or 
merely a holdover from the traditional principles of collectivism. 128 
Article 14's wording does limit the appropriation power to "[a]ny 
patent of a Chinese individual or entity under collective owner-
ship."129 The concern has been whether patents of foreign joint 
ventures with Chinese entities would be swept within the ambit of 
this provision.130 
Property, the Chinese Government will prevent trade secrets from being disclosed 
to, acquired by, or used by others without the consent of the trade secret owner in 
a manner contrary to honest commercial practices including the acquisition, use or 
disclosure of trade secrets by third parties who knew, or had reasonable grounds to 
know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition of such information. 
MOU, supra note 8, art. 4. 
125 Chuanjie, supra note 99, at 69. 
126 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 14; see also Pinard, supra note 11, at 80. Pinard points out 
that the decision to allow appropriation from patent holders must be made by the State 
Council, which provides a check on local governments. Pinard, supra note 11, at 80. 
127 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 154,261,271 (1988). 
128 Pinard, supra note 11, at 80. This provision is most likely a holdover from China's socialist 
orientation towards collectivism, because it allows the local governments, not the Patent 
Office, to make such determinations. Contrast the U.S. Patent Law, which does not include 
any provision for the government to usurp patentable inventions. Given the broad scope of 
the sovereign power of eminent domain, however, the U.S. government could probably take 
an otherwise patentable invention from its rightful owner, although most likely subject to the 
Takings Clause. U.S. CaNsT. amend. V. 
129 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 14. 
130 See supra note 109. One commentator asserts, however, that Chinese-foreign joint ven-
tures are not Chinese entities or collective enterprises under the wording of article 14. Pinard, 
supra note 11, at 80. 
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A further provision of China's Patent Law, conceptually related to 
involuntary dissemination, is compulsory licensing. 131 Compulsory 
licensing encroaches on, or limits, the property rights of the inven-
tor to exclude others from using his invention.132 For example, 
contrary to U.S. law, a patentee actually must put the patent to use 
in China within three years or any person or entity can request a 
license.133 The Patent Law states that if, "without any justified reason" 
a patentee fails to employ himself, or license, his patent, the Patent 
Office will grant a compulsory license if the person requesting the 
compulsory license demonstrates that he could not arrange a license 
with the patentee on "reasonable terms."134 Just what constitutes 
reasonable terms is undefined in the Paten t Law, however. Moreover, 
mere importation of patented products may not be sufficient under 
article 51 to constitute ''working'' the patent. 135 Upon such a request 
and showing, the Patent Office will grant a non-exclusive license and 
impose what it considers to be an equitable licensing fee. 136 
The purpose of this policy is to prevent the practice of stockpiling 
patents without using them. Although stockpiling is common in 
more developed countries like the United States, it is undesirable in 
a developing economy because it will retard development. 137 In ad-
dition, compulsory licensing also could be viewed as a trade-off 
between the need in a market economy for the certainty of exclusive 
proprietary rights and the lingering socialist principle of collective 
ownership.138 In defense of China's compulsory licensing provisions, 
however, no approved patent has yet to be subjected to compulsory 
licensing,139 and any such grant can be challenged in the courts.140 
If these provisions present any cause for concern based on collectiv-
ism principles, article 14 probably presents more problems for do-
mestic inventors than for foreign investors, based on China's ex-
pressed desire to smooth the way for foreign technology transfer and 
131 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 51. 
132Id. 
133Id. art. 52. 
134 Id. art. 54. 
135 Pinard, supra note 11, at 83. 
136 Patent Law, supra note 6, arts. 56, 57. 
137Beaumont, supra note 10, at 54. 
138 See Kay, supra note 39, at 336--38; Sidel, supra note 12, at 282. But see Wang, supra note 
13, at 200-05 (advancing a well-reasoned argument that a society like China's based on 
collective ownership can allow proprietary rights in individuals without creating a fundamen-
tal contradiction). 
139 See Lulin, supra note 76. 
140 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 58. 
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trade.141 Finally, China's compulsory licensing provisions are not all 
that different from the rules of other countries, which call for for-
feiture or revocation of patents that are granted but not worked.142 
4. Enforcement Difficulties 
Under the Patent Law, foreign applications are governed by bilat-
eral treaties, international conventions, and the principle of reci-
procity.143 Commentators have criticized the fact that there is no 
recognition of foreign patents,144 and no protection within China 
unless a bilateral treaty already exists. 145 Moreover, due to ambiguous 
definitions, a foreign entity or joint venture might be designated 
domestic, thus subjecting its patent to the power of the government 
to transfer the patent rights. 146 An ameliorating influence exists in 
terms of the relations China has with the patentee's country of 
origin and the constraints of other treaties to which China is a 
signatory. 147 
Other enforcement difficulties abound. For example, some com-
mentators contend that administrative remedies under the Patent 
Law and Implementing Regulations are unclear.148 Problems also 
arise in using the Chinese courts to enforce patent rights,149 which 
have been exacerbated by the paucity of lawyers in general, and 
especially those trained in patent law.150 Finally, investors and patent-
141 Beaumont, supra note 10, at 39. 
142 Id. at 54. 
143 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 18. 
144 Oehler, supra note 33, at 460...{i 1 (citing China's Developing Legal Strudure fur Trade and 
Commerce: Hearings Before the SPecial Subcomm. on U.S. Trade with China of the House Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, 69-70 (1987) (written statement ofJohnJ. 
Byrne and Eugene Theroux». 
145Pinard, supra note 11, at 70. 
146 Id. at 81. 
147 Sidel, supra note 12, at 285. For example, China is a signatory to the Paris Convention 
and accepts the Convention's novelty requirements and priority dates provisions. Pinard, supra 
note 11, at 73. China is no longer a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) but is working to reenter that agreement. China's Revised Patent Law Conforms to 
International Standards, Official Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 16, 1992) [hereinafter 
Revised Patent Law]. 
148 Pinard, supra note 11, at 85. 
149For example, inexperience with patent matters and the intermediate court's sole juris-
diction over foreigners are discussed in the literature. See id. at 87. Original jurisdiction for 
patent infringement actions lies with the Intermediate People's Courts. Chuanjie, supra note 
99, at 69. In addition, appeals to the higher People's Courts are available. Id. Interestingly, if 
the defendant counterclaims that the patent is invalid, the action is suspended and referred 
to the Patent Office for a final decision regarding validity. Id. 
150 Reforms Demand More Lawyer Services, BEIJING REv., Sept. 21-27,1992, at 11-12. 
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ees complain that infringement actions are weak, since a non-licen-
see can use a patented product freely for scientific research or 
experimentation, and secondary use or sale is not infringement. l5l 
In fact, under the Patent Law, unauthorized use or sale is exempt 
from legal prosecution for infringement without a showing of actual 
knowledge of infringement, which is an almost impossible burden 
of proof.152 In addition, infringement penalties only accrue after the 
patent has been granted, but not for any infringement in the period 
before the grant and after the application has been filed. 153 
D. The Gathering Storm Before the Amendments to the Patent Law 
Although foreign investors and companies initially reacted posi-
tively to the enactment of the Patent Law, entities actually entering 
or desiring to enter the Chinese market reported continuing prob-
lems between 1985 and 1991.154 Specifically, U.S. trade officials esti-
mated that the total annual loss due to industrial piracy and patent 
infringement by the Chinese neared $400 million. 155 Reports from 
academia appeared to substantiate the problem.156 In separate analy-
ses performed during 1988, the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC)157 and the U.S. Department of State158 also 
151 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 62; see also Pinard, supra note 11, at 85-86; Beaumont, 
supra note 10, at 55; Liu, supra note 98, at 378. Liu points out that "the issuance of a patent 
is not considered constructive notice!" Lui, supra note 98, at 375. 
152 Pinard, supra note 11, at 86. 
153Id. at 77-78. 
154Unspecified problems with Chinese patent laws were reported to Congress by U.S. 
companies doing business in the Far East during debates on the United States-China Trade 
Act of 1992. 138 CONGo REc. E2386 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Gilchrist). In 
addition, the Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers Association has estimated that U.s. companies 
lost between $245-305 million annually as a result of piracy of their pharmaceutical products. 
Richard Seltzer, Intellectual Property Pact to Protect United States Chemicals in China, CHEM. & 
ENG'R NEWS, jan. 27, 1992, at 4, available in WESTlAW, Asia-Pacif File. For example, Mon-
santo Corp. reported that its patented pesticides Roundup, Lasso, and Machete were all being 
illegally fabricated in China in 1991. Id. 
155 Stuart Auerbach, China, U.S. Reach Trade Accard, WASH. PosT,jan. 17, 1992, at a24. 
156William P. Alford, Pressuring the Pirate, L.A. TIMES, jan. 12, 1992, at 5. Mr. Alford is the 
Henry Stimson Professor of Law and director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law 
School. Professor Alford remarks in the article that "China is, indeed, at the forefront of 
nations pirating intellectual property." (mentioning illegal copies of everything from Mickey 
Mouse to computers, clothing, and chemicals). Id. 
157U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and The 
Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, USITC Pub. 2065, (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter USITC Re-
port]. 
158INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SEGMENT: STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY REPORTS ON Eco-
NOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES, jan. 31, 1989, (monograph), microformed on Congo 
Index (CCH). 
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found significant problems with the enforcement of U.S. intellectual 
property rights by China, which were causing a deleterious effect on 
U.S. trade. 
These private and governmental reports, and similar complaints 
to the USTR, led to a Section 301 investigation as well as listing 
China as a priority country in 1991.159 In finding adequate evidence 
to support the unfair trade practice claims, the USTR in late 1991 
threatened China with the imposition of increased duties on $1.5 
billion of Chinese imports to the United States.160 As part of the 
notification of the impending tariffs, the USTR set a deadline of 
January 17,1992 for representatives of the Chinese government to 
meet with U.S. officials and commit to major reforms of China's 
protection of intellectual property, specifically the Patent Law.161 The 
two governments negotiated an agreement to improve intellectual 
property protection scant hours before the deadline and issued a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).162 
The Chinese negotiators agreed to draft amendments to the Pat-
ent Law, submit these amendments to their legislative body, and 
undertake their best efforts to assure passage by January 1, 1993.163 
Later reports out of China indicating the government's diligence 
underscored the remarkable level of concern that the leadership has 
developed for foreign trade and economic matters.164 The negotia-
tors submitted the proposed amendments to the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People's Congress on June 23, 1992.165 The 
amendments were adopted on September 4, 1992,166 only seven and 
one-half months after the MOU, a remarkably rapid legislative ef-
fort. 
Meanwhile, during July and August of 1992, the U.S. Congress 
intensely debated the United States-China Trade Act of 1992,167 
159 See supra text accompanying note 55; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c). 
160 Auerbach, supra note 155. The increased duties would have doubled tariffs on $1.5 
billion of goods. Id. Such an increase probably would have had the effect of preventing these 
imports into the United States. 
161Id. 
162MOU, supra note 8. The provisions relevant to the proposed PRC Patent Law revisions 
are contained in article 1 of the MOU, the text of which appears in Appendix A. 
163MOU, supra note 8, art. 1, t 2. 
164 See Conventions, supra note 2 (quoting Gao Lulin, director general ofthe Chinese Patent 
Office, remarking on the speedy presentation of the Amendments to the Standing Committee, 
and saying: 'This represents how the Chinese Government keeps its promise."). Id. 
165 Amendments, supra note 7. 
166 Id. 
167United States-China Trade Act, H.R. 5318, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The United 
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which contemplated stripping China of most-favored-nation (MFN) 
trade status. 168 Given what China stood to lose by removal of MFN 
status in terms of trade benefits and reputation, and its recognition 
of the lingering political impediment to trade relations created by 
the Tiananmen Square incident, the debates in the U.S. Congress 
probably had a strong effect on the Chinese leadership. The rapid 
implementation of the Patent Law amendments was clearly an at-
tempt to broadcast a message of good faith and fair dealing to 
assuage the anti-China lobby in Congress and to prevent a stumbling 
block to China's stunning economic growth of recent years. 
III. AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT LAW 
The Amendments to China's Patent Law, which became effective 
January 1, 1993,169 affected nineteen of the original sixty-nine arti-
cles of the Patent Law. 170 In general, the amendments followed the 
letter of the compromises ironed out in the MOU171 and complied 
with the spirit of the MOU to an extent that would have been 
unthinkable to the Chinese leadership even ten years ago. 
The following chart presents a summary view of the evolution of 
China's law dealing with the protection of patents. Column A lists 
defects in the original Patent Law as reported in the academic 
literature and by international investors. 172 Column B lists items 
subject to the MOU.173 Column C lists provisions modified by the 
recent amendments. 174 Note that China enacted a number of modi-
fications beyond the terms of the MOU, indicating that the Chinese 
States-China Trade Act was a new piece oflegislation which sought to define certain privileges 
and practices of trade relations between the two countries, such as tariffs and most-favored 
nation (MFN) status. (MFN status merely means that a country receives the lowest available 
tariff structure.) This legislation proposed to remove China's MFN status. Id. Although the 
purported rationale for the legislation was piracy of intellectual property, most observers 
decried the removal of MFN status as political retribution for the Chinese government's 
suppression of the student protest movement in Tiananmen Square earlier in 1989. 
168 Members of the House claimed exporters were seeing patents abused by "unscrupulous 
Chinese." 138 CONGo REc. S15913 (dailyed. Oct. 1, 1992) (statement of Sen. Glenn). President 
Bush vetoed the House's withdrawal of MFN status for China as an inappropriate linkage to 
China's improving human rights and political retribution for Tiananmen Square. See id. 
(statement of Sen. Shelby presenting message of Pres. Bush). 
169 Patent Law Revisions Include Expansion of Patentable Goods, PATENT, TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA), Nov. 18,1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA-PTD File. 
170 Amendments, supra note 7. 
m See id. 
172 See supra part II, sec. C. 
173 See MOU, supra note 8. 
174 See Amendments, supra note 7. 
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have been sensitive to academic criticism and seem dedicated to 
providing a greater level of protection for foreign investors.175 China 
clearly used the opportunity of amending the Patent Law to respond 
to perceived structural defects in the Patent Law that had not risen 
to the level of significance to be required by the MOU. 
A B C 
Defects Identified In the Changes Required by Amendments 
1984 Law MOU Enacted 
17-year patent term (not 20-year paten t grant 20-year patent grant 
criticized) 
Nonpatentability of Modify to allow as Made patentable (limited 
chemicals & patentable subject matter retroactive coverage) 
pharmaceu ticals 
Novelty (patent barred if Not required by MOU 12 month grace period 
previously granted Limits disclosure manner 
elsewhere) 
"Foreign" applicants Not required by MOU No amendment 
ambiguity 
First-ta-file system Not required by MOU No amendment 
Publication of applications Not required by MOU Publication at end of 18 
within 18 months months 
Involuntary disseminations Not required by MOU Limited to "except as 
(article 14) provided by law" 
Compulsory licensing Reasonable efforts to Amendment added 
(obligation to employ employ 
patent) 
Bilateral treaty Not required by MOU Not amended 
requirements 
Administrative remedies Not required by MOU Not amended 
unclear 
Inexperience of Chinese Not required by MOU Not amended 
courts 
Few examiners & patent Not required by MOU Not amended 
attorneys 
Secondary use/sale Not required by MOU Not amended 
exception 
Imports of infringing Include right to prevent Right to prevent included 
products (article 11) infringing imports 
Burden of proof for Shift to Defendant Shifted (article 60) 
infringement on Plaintiff 
175 Many of the criticisms made in the academic literature were ignored in both the MOU 
and Amendments. The primary concerns of investors, however, such as subject matter limita-
tions and compulsory licensing, were addressed. This approach indicates China's pragmatic 
motivation and desire for a workable, rather than theoretically ideal law. 
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A Chapter I Amendments 
In Chapter I, General Provisions of the Patent Law,176 the Amend-
ments modified article 11 which deals with exclusivity.177 The origi-
nal Patent Law made the patentee's exclusive right to exploit the 
patent subject to the constraints of article 14.178 The Amendments 
delete the reference to article 14, and substitute the phrase "except 
as provided by law," indicating a weakening of the power of the 
authorities to invoke the compulsory licensing aspects of article 14 
against foreign investors, such as joint ventures with domestic col-
lective enterprises that would be subject to article 14. The new 
phraseology also seems to indicate that the power to invoke article 
14 would be subject to judicial review, because the Chinese interme-
diate courts have jurisdiction over disputes pertaining to foreigners 
under Chinese laws. 179 
The Amendmen ts also add a new paragraph to article 11, empow-
ering the patentee to "stop others from importing the patented 
product or products directly obtained by applying the patented 
process ... without the patentee's authorization."18o This modifica-
176 Chapter I consists of articles 1-21. Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 1. 
177 [d. art. 11. Article 11 reads as follows: 
Mter the granting of the patent right for an invention or utility model, except as 
provided for in Article 14 of this Law, no entity or individual may, without the 
authorization of the patentee, exploit the patent, that is, make, use or sell the 
patented product, or use the patented process, for production or business purposes. 
Mter the granting of the patent right for a design, no entity or individual may, 
without the authorization of the patentee, exploit the patent, that is, make or sell 
the product, incorporating the patented design, for production or business pur-
poses. 
[d. (Emphasis indicates amended language.) 
178 [d. Article 14 empowers the Central Government or the governments of the provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities to require patents held by Chinese nationals or 
collective entities to be licensed to designees of those governments, where the patent is of 
great significance or importance to the state or public interest. [d. art. 14; see supra notes 
122-26 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra note 105. 
180 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 11. The amendment reads as follows: 
Mter a patent right is granted for an invention or utility model, except as provided 
for by law, no entity or individual may, without the patentee's authorization, manu-
facture for production or business purposes, utilize or sell the patented product, or 
make use of a patented process, or use or sell a product directly obtained by applying 
the patented process. 
Mter a patent right is granted for a design, no entity or individual may, without 
the patentee's authorization, manufacture for production or business purposes or 
sell products of the patented design. 
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tion has the effect of protecting domestic patentees, whether Chi-
nese patentees, joint venturers, or foreign entities with assigned 
patent rights, from outside infringement. These amendments ad-
dress the spirit of constraining the potential impact of compulsory 
licensing detailed in the MOUI81 and specifically incorporate the 
clarification of the right to exclude others from using a patented 
process, including the additional right to exclude infringing imports 
specified in the MOU. 182 
B. Chapter II Amendments 
The Amendments to Chapter II, Patent Grant Requirements,183 af-
fected article 25, which originally excluded from patentability foods, 
beverages and flavorings, and pharmaceutical products and sub-
stances obtained by means of a chemical process.184 Pursuant to the 
MOU,185 all of these categories have been eliminated from the ex-
clusionary list by the Amendments to the Patent Law. 186 The lack of 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals and chemicals had been a 
major concern for foreign investors,187 especially given the severe 
losses foreign drug and industrial chemical manufacturers had suf-
[d. 
After the grant of a patent right, except as provided by law, the patentee shall have 
the right to stop others from importing the patented product or products directly 
obtained by applying the patented process for usage mentioned in the two preceding 
paragraphs without the patentee's authorization. 
181 MOU, supra note 8, art. 1 (d). See infra Appendix A for full text of the MOU. 
182 [d. art. 1 (b). 
183 Chapter II consists of articles 22-25, which define the subject matter of patents. 
184 Patent Law, supra note 6, arts. 25(4), 25(5). The text of article 25 reads as follows: 
For any of the following, no patent right shall be granted: 
(l) Scientific discoveries; 
(2) Rules and methods for mental activities; 
(3) Methods for the diagnosis or for the treatment of diseases; 
(4) Food, beverages and flavorings; 
(5) Pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of a chemical process; 
(6) Animal and plant varieties; 
(7) Substances obtained by means of nuclear transformation. 
For processes used in producing products referred to in items (4) to (6) of the 
preceding paragraph, patent right may be granted in accordance with provisions of 
this Law. 
[d. (Emphasis indicates sections deleted by amendments.) 
185MOU, supra note 8, art. 1 (a). 
186 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 25. 
187 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
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fered by unauthorized fabrication of their products by Chinese com-
panies.188 
The provisions for patentability of drugs and other chemicals, 
such as agricultural products, are a major concession by China, given 
that this policy runs counter to the practice of newly developing 
countries to prevent excessive dependence and encourage local 
development. 189 The major problem with this Amendment is that it 
is not retroactive, except as regards chemicals and drugs that re-
ceived patents after January 1, 1986 and already have been marketed 
in China.190 Thus, only products of this sort that have not been 
"marketed" (which some cynics might define as those not already 
copied) in China receive "administrative protection" under the 
terms of the MOU. 191 
C. Chapter III Amendments 
In Chapter III, Application for Patent, 192 articles 29, 30, and 33 were 
amended. Article 29, which defines the right of priority,193 now 
extends the right of priority to cover designs as well as the inven-
tion-creations and utility models covered in the originallaw.194 Ad-
188 See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. Pharmaceutical companies especially had 
been victimized by infringement on their patents by various manufacturers in southeast Asia. 
See generally USITC Report, supra note 157. 
189 See SHERWOOD, supra note 22, at 159; Liu, supra note 98, at 382; see also Beaumont, supra 
note 10, at 49-50 (citing public policy reasons to restrict patenting pharmaceuticals). 
190 MOU, supra note 8, art 2; Revised Patent Law, supra note 147. 
191 MOU, supra note 8. 
192 Chapter III consists of articles 26-33. Patent Law, supra note 6. 
193 [d. The "right of priority" refers to the grace period extended to right holders who have 
filed a patent for an invention in a foreign country. Such a filing creates a grace period of 12 
months against other potential filers in which to file for a patent in China. This provision is 
common to other patent systems in use around the world. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 119 (988). 
194 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 29. The text reads as follows: 
Where any foreign applicant files an application in China within 12 months from 
the date on which he or it first filed in a foreign country an application for a patent 
for the identical invention or utility model, or within six months from the date on 
which he or it first filed in a foreign country, an application for a patent for the 
identical design, he or it may, in accordance with any agreement concluded between 
the country to which he or it belongs and China, or in accordance with any inter-
national treaty to which both countries are party, or on the basis of the principle of 
mutual recognition of the right of priority, enjoy a right of priority, that is, the date 
of which the application was first filed in the foreign country shall be regarded as 
the date of filing. 
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ditionally, the shorter statutory period for the right of priority has 
been dropped. 195 Originally, the right of priority was eliminated if 
the inventor displayed the item at an international exhibition, pub-
licly aired it at an academic or technical meeting, or if the invention 
was disclosed by any person, even without consent of the applicant. 196 
This amendment thus conforms more closely to international stand-
ards regarding due diligence by the inventor as to filing and elimi-
nates the burdensome condition of the grace period being nullified 
by unscrupulous advance disclosures.197 
Article 30, which also relates to the right of priority, was modified 
to require submission in China within three months of the applica-
tion filed in the foreign country. 198 The original Paten t Law required 
[d. 
Where the applicant claims a right of priority and where one of the events listed 
in article 24 of this law occurred, the period of the right of priority shall be counted 
from the date on which the event occurred. 
195 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 29. The amended text reads as follows: 
[d. 
If an applicant files an application in China within 12 months from the date on 
which they first filed an application in a foreign country for a patent for the identical 
invention or utility model, or within six months from the date on which they first 
filed in a foreign country, an application for a patent for the identical design, they 
may, in accordance with any agreement concluded between that foreign country and 
China, or in accordance with any international treaty to which both countries are 
party, or on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition of the right of priority, 
enjoy a right of priority. 
If an applicant files an application with the Patent Office within 12 months from 
the date on which they first filed in China for a patent for the identical invention 
or utility model, they may enjoy a right of priority. 
196 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 24. The text of article 24 reads as follows: 
[d. 
An invention-creation for which a patent is applied does not lose its novelty where, 
within six months before the date of filing, one of the following events occurred: 
(1) Where it was first exhibited at an international exhibition sponsored or recog-
nized by the Chinese Government; 
(2) Where it was first made public at a prescribed academic or technological 
meeting; 
(3) Where it was disclosed by any person without the consent of the applicant. 
197 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988). 
198 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 30. Article 30 now reads as follows: 
[d. 
Any applicant who claims the right of priority shall make a written declaration when 
the application is filed and submit within three months a copy of the first-submitted 
patent application document; if the applicant fails to make the written declaration 
or to meet the time limit for submitting the document, the claim to the right of 
priority shall be deemed not to have been made. 
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a written declaration of the filing date in the foreign country cer-
tified by an official of that country in addition to the submission of 
the actual application within three months. 199 This modification thus 
streamlines the application process in China for foreign inventors 
and creates a domestic right of priority. Regarding other amend-
ments to this chapter, the changes to article 33 merely clarify the 
language of the patent amending process, and do not include sub-
stantive legal modifications.20o 
D. Chapter IV Amendments 
Amendments to Chapter IV, Examination and Approval of Applica-
tion for a Patent,201 affect articles 34, 39, 40, 41, 43, and 44. Article 
34, concerning the publication of applications, now requires the 
Patent Office to publish a conforming application at the expiration 
of eighteen months, rather than within eighteen months, as origi-
nally mandated.202 The Amendments ignore the problem of appli-
cations that are not approved within eighteen months, however, 
thereby exposing the applicant to undesirable public disclosure 
before the extension of patent protection. The volume of patent 
applications in China, already increasing exponentially,203 may com-
pound the problem of undesired disclosures as a function of the 
operation of the Law. Patent officials in China are not blind to the 
problem, however, and have announced plans to train and employ 
more staff to process patent applications expeditiously and prevent 
applications from overwhelming the resources of the Chinese Patent 
Office.204 
199 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 30. 
200 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 33. This article establishes that the applicant cannot 
exceed the scope of the invention-creation, utility model or design as stated or depicted in 
the original application. Cf 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1988) (establishing a similar constraint upon 
amended patent applications). 
201 Chapter N consists of articles 34-44. Patent Law, supra note 6. 
202 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 34. The original text of article 34 reads as follows: 
Where, after receiving an application for a patent for invention, the Patent Office, 
upon preliminary examination, finds the applications to be in conformity with the 
requirements of this Law, it shall publish the application within 18 months from the 
date of filing. Upon the request of the applicant, the Patent Office may publish the 
application earlier. 
Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 34. 
203 See supra note 91. 
204 Reforms Demand More Lawyer Services, BEIJING REV. Sept. 21-27, 1992, at 11-12. 
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Articles 39205 and 40206 relate to the examination of the application 
as to substance.207 The Amendments allow the Patent Office to issue 
the patent, register the patent, and notify the applicant. 208 The 
original Patent Law neglected to include the issuance and registra-
tion process before notifYing the applicant. 209 The amendment to 
article 41 extends the statutory period for filing an objection to a 
patent grant from three months to six months, simplifies the oppo-
sition filing requirements, and removes the requirement that the 
Patent Office notifY the patentee before reaching a decision. 210 Re-
vised article 43 expands the services of the existing Paten t Re-exami-
nation Board to include filings by parties opposing a patent or 
appealing a rejection. 2l1 The Amendments also add completely new 
language to article 44, establishing that "[a] cancelled patent right 
shall be regarded as if it had never existed. "212 This provision appar-
ently responds to a desire by the government to allow immediate 
use by interested parties of information disclosed by a patent appli-
cation that does not rise to the level of patentability. 
E. Chapter V Amendments 
Chapter V of the Patent Law, Duration, Cessation and Invalidation 
of Patent Right, consists of articles 45-50. The Amendments affected 
articles 45, 48, and 50. Pursuant to the MOU,213 the Amendments 
modified article 45 to extend the duration of the patent right for 
invention-creations from seventeen to twenty years, and the duration 
of the patent right for utility models and designs from five to ten 
205 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 39. This article reads as follows: "Where it is found after 
examination as to substance that there is no cause for rejection of the application for a patent 
for invention, the Patent Office shall make a decision, announce it, and notifY the applicant." 
Id. 
206 Id. art. 40. Article 40 reads as follows: 
Id. 
Where, after receiving the application for a patent for utility model or design, the 
Patent Office finds upon preliminary examination that the application is in conform-
ity with the requirements of this Law, it shall not proceed to examine it as to 
substance but shall immediately make an announcement and notifY the applicant. 
207 Substance indicates that the application meets the statutory tests for novelty, inventive-
ness, and other disclosure bars. 
208 Amendments, supra note 7, arts. 39, 40. 
209 See Patent Law, supra note 6, arts. 39, 40. 
210 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 41. 
211 Id. art. 43. 
212 Id. art. 44. 
213MOU, supra note 8, art. l(c). 
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years. 214 Because the statutory period still runs from the filing of the 
application rather than the granting of the patent,215 this amend-
ment is a useful response to the problem of administrative delays. 
In addition, a twenty-year patent term better accommodates the 
sometimes lengthy procedures involved with human testing and 
registration of agrichemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Article 48 was altered to limit the period in which opposition to a 
patent could be brought before the Patent Re-examination Board.216 
Originally, anyone could challenge the validity of a patent with no 
statute of limitations period after the original grant of approval; the 
Amendments now limit the challenge period to six months after the 
announcement of the patent grant. 217 Thus, a more efficient system 
of a post-grant administrative revocation period replaces the prob-
lematic pre-grant opposition period. Interestingly, this new provi-
sion seems contrary to the policy reasons for allowing an unlimited 
period in which to challenge patents because society has an interest 
in reducing the number of patents in force, given the near-monop-
olistic level of power patents afford to entities. 
Article 50, which is similar to article 44, states that any patent 
deemed invalid will be considered non-existent from the begin-
ning. 2lS The Amendments added language, however, stating that 
such a decree of invalidity will not have any ex post facto effect on a 
judicial or administrative ruling of infringement and any penalties 
assessed thereof. 219 
F. Chapter VI Amendments 
Chapter VI, Compulsory License for Exploitation of Patent Right, 
consists of articles 51-58, of which articles 51 and 52 were modified. 
The most substantive and extensive changes to the Patent Law 
agreed to in the MOU concerned compulsory licensing.220 Origi-
nally, the Patent Law established an unconditional use requirement 
214 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 45. 
215Id. 
216Id. art. 48. The original article 48 read as follows: "[w] here after the grant of the patent 
right, any entity or individual considers that the grant of the said patent right is not in 
conformity with the provisions of this Law, it or he may request the Patent Re-examination 
Board to declare the patent right invalid." Id. 
217Id. 
218 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 50. 
219 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 50. 
220 MOU, supra note 8, art. l(d). 
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for all patents granted in China,221 and further defined the use 
requirement by granting power to the Patent Office to issue a license 
to a requesting entity where the use had not taken place.222 Com-
mentators had interpreted this Chapter as a limit on the exclusive 
right to exploit an invention, while retaining the economic incentive 
of compensation for invention.223 Compulsory licensing, although 
commonly used by other countries,224 especially developing econo-
mies,225 is anathema to the U.S. system of intellectual property pro-
tection based on principles of property law, free enterprise, and 
prevention of government intervention.226 The MOU clearly reflects 
that philosophy.227 
Pursuant to the MOU,228 the Amendments scaled back the uncon-
ditional nature of the original compulsory licensing power and 
incorporated the concepts of reasonable efforts to license229 and 
determination of the individual merits of each licensing request. 230 
In addition, importing patented products now satisfies the use re-
221 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 51. The text of article 51 read as follows: "[tlhe patentee 
himself or itself has the obligation to make the patented product, or to use the patented 
product, in China, or otherwise to authorize other persons to make the patented product, or 
use the patented process, in China." Id. 
222 Patent Law, supra note 6, art. 52. The text of article 52 read as follows: 
Id. 
Where the patentee of an invention or utility model fails, without any justified 
reason, by the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of the patent 
right, to fulfill the obligation set forth in article 51, the Patent Office may, upon the 
request of an entity which is qualified to exploit the invention or utility model, grant 
a compulsory license to exploit the patent. 
223 Wang, supra note 13, at 200. 
224 Id. at 210. 
225 See SHERWOOD, supra note 22, at 159. 
226U.S. anti-trust laws, however, may provide the same economic result as compulsory 
licensing by indirectly preventing the accumulation and non-licensing of technology that 
results in excessive dominance by one entity of a market niche. See Wang, supra note 13, at 
211. 
227 See generally MOU, supra note 8, art. 1 (I)(d). 
228 Id. art. 1 (1), (2). 
229 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 51. The amended text reads as follows: 
Where a qualified entity who requests on reasonable terms the patentee of an 
invention or utility model the license to exploit his or its patent is unable to obtain 
such license within a reasonably long period of time, the Patent Office may, upon 
the request of the entity, grant a compulsory license to exploit such patent. 
Id. Foreign patent holders should be aware, however, that the Patent Law still theoretically 
allows an applicant for a license to force the issue if the reviewing authorities consider the 
applicant's terms of licensing to be reasonable. 
230 See MOU, supra note 8, art. 1 (l)(d) (ii)(I). 
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quirement, whereas the original law required domestic manufactur-
ing to avoid compulsory licensing.231 Curiously, the exception al-
lowed in the MOD for compulsory licensing where non-use of a 
patent has been determined to be motivated by anti-competitive-
ness did not appear in the Amendments, unless the language in 
amended article 52 referring to the "public benefit" can be con-
strued as such.232 
Two other open issues remain concerning the Amendments to 
the Compulsory Licensing Chapter, in terms of their consistency 
with the MOD. First, instead of a three-year waiting period before a 
domestic entity can ask for a compulsory license, the Amendments 
allow such requests after a "reasonable period of time." Second, the 
Amendments incorporate new language regarding the power of the 
government to impose a compulsory license in the event of an 
"extraordinary state of affairs." The language in both of these pro-
visions is ambiguous and adds to, rather than subtracts from, inves-
tors' uncertainty. 
Although some commentators may claim that the modifications 
to the Patent Law in the area of compulsory licensing are perfunc-
tory, the key elements of the MOD do appear to have been incor-
porated, and to an extent that demonstrates a significant concession 
by the Chinese government. In addition, the fact that no compul-
sory licenses were granted under the earlier, more liberal rules, is 
an indication that the Chinese have taken a practical viewpoint 
regarding their legal authority versus their economic self-interest. 
Nevertheless, foreign investors holding patent rights should remain 
wary of obtaining patent rights in China solely for the purpose of 
suppressing the use of the patented product or process. 
CONCLUSION 
The PRC Patent Law is an instructive example of a legal doctrine 
changing the political and economic framework of a nation. Typi-
cally, legal doctrines develop to reflect changes in the underlying 
social and political characteristics of a nation. Here is a case where 
the legal protection afforded to intellectual property has been the 
engine for changes, perhaps to a degree unanticipated, in the 
political philosophy of socialist China. The ultimate question is 
231 See Lulin, supra note 76. 
232 Amendments, supra note 7, art. 52. The amended text reads as follows: "[i]n the case of 
a state emergency, unusual situation, or for the purpose of public benefit, the Patent Office 
may grant a compulsory license to exploit the patent of an invention or utility model." [d. 
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whether such changes put China on a slippery slope towards a 
capitalist structure they have rejected adamantly since 1949, or 
whether the Chinese have the political and cultural will to prevent 
changes in their legal structure from altering their political and 
economic landscape into an unrecognizable or at least hybrid form. 
Can the Chinese adopt legal doctrines like intellectual property 
protection that cut at the heart of Marxist principles of State-owned 
property and yet retain the socialist state that historically achieved 
political uniformity? 
The extent of China's concessions to foreign investors reflects 
a determination to straddle conflicting pressures, but the conse-
quences of increasing development and more widespread access by 
the populace to the fruits of innovation do not bode well for the 
more restrictive elements of the socialist political system. Like Japan 
before Admiral Dewey or China itself before the Opium Wars, an 
iconoclastic, isolationist culture is unlikely to survive contact with 
aggressive market economies, especially once the isolationists adopt 
the legal framework such economies require to operate at full effi-
ciency. Fully aware that they constitute the world's largest remaining 
potential market, the Chinese leadership is taking the correct steps 
to ensure their sovereignty and integration into the world economy 
by adopting the precepts of western law, such as intellectual property 
protection, to manage their entry onto the playing field in as orderly 
a fashion as possible. In the case of its recent Amendments to the 
Patent Law, China merely is altering the tailoring of a suit it already 
has found quite comfortable to wear, at least from an economic 
perspective. 
On balance, the Amendments to the Patent Law should allow 
investors to act with more confidence in the turbulent waters of 
China's burgeoning commercial markets. Indeed, where the Law 
remains ambiguous or even inadequate by world standards, political 
and economic forces should more than compensate for such legal 
lacunae. 
Laurence P. Harrington 
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APPENDIX A 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government 
of the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
the United States of America on the Protection of Intellec-
tual Property 
371 
In the spirit of cooperation embodied in their bilateral Agreement 
on Trade Relations and consistent with the principles of the relevant 
international agreements, the Government of the People's Republic 
of China (Chinese Government) and the Government of the United 
States of America (U,S. Government) have reached a mutual under-
standing on the following issues: 
ARTICLE 1 
l. The Chinese Government will provide the following levels of 
protection under the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China: 
(a) Patentable Subject Matter 
Patents shall be available for all chemical inventions, including 
pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, whether products 
or processes. 
(b) Righ ts Conferred 
A patent shall confer the right to prevent others not having the 
patent owner's consent from making, using, or selling the sub-
ject matter of the patent. In the case of a patented process, the 
patent shall confer the right to prevent others not having the 
patent owner's consent from using the process and from using, 
selling, or importing the product obtained directly by the proc-
ess. 
(c) Term of Protection 
The term of protection for a patent of invention will be 20 years 
from the date of filing of the patent application. 
(d) Compulsory Licenses 
(i) Patent rights shall be enjoyable without discrimination as to 
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced. 
(ii) Where China's law allows for use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including 
use by the government or third parties authorized by the gov-
ernment, the following provisions shall be respected: 
(l) authorization of such use shall be considered on its indi-
vidual merits; 
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(2) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the 
proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from 
the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and condi-
tions and such efforts have not been successful within a 
reasonable period of time, This requirement may be waived 
by the government in the case of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public 
non-commercial use. In circumstances of extreme urgency, 
the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as 
reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial 
use, where the government or contractor, without making a 
patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know 
that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, 
the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
(3) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the 
purpose for which it was authorized; 
(4) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(5) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of 
the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use; 
(6) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the 
supply of China's domestic market; 
(7) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to ade-
quate protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so 
authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances 
which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The 
competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon 
motivated request, the continued existence of these circum-
stances; 
(8) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in 
the circumstances of each case, taking into account the eco-
nomic value of the authorization; 
(9) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authori-
zation of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other 
independent review by a distinct higher authority; 
(10) any decision relating to remuneration provided in re-
spect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other 
independent review by a distinct higher authority; 
(11) the conditions set forth in sub-paragraphs (2) and (6) 
above are not required to be applied where such use is per-
mitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to 
correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account 
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in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. 
Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse ter-
mination of authorization if and when the conditions which 
led to such authorization are likely to recur; 
(12) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation 
of a patent ("the second patent") which cannot be exploited 
without infringing another patent ("the first patent"), the 
following additional conditions shall apply: 
(A) the invention claimed in the second patent shall in-
volve an important technical advance of considerable eco-
nomic significance in relation to the invention claimed in 
the first patent; 
(B) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a 
cross-license on reasonable terms to use the invention 
claimed in the second patent; and 
(C) the use authorized in the respect of the first patent 
shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the 
first patent. 
2. The Chinese Government will submit a bill to provide the level 
of protection specified in subparagraph 1 of this Article to its legis-
lative body and will exert its best efforts to have enacted and to 
implement the amended patent law by January 1, 1993. 
3. Both Governments reaffirm their commitments to each other 
under the Paris Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial Property 
(Stockholm 1967) and their continued commitment to observe the 
principle of national treatment with respect to providing patent 
protection for the natural and legal persons of the other Party. 
4. If the U.S. Government becomes a party to an international 
convention that requires the United States to provide a patent term 
of at least 20 years from the date of filing of the patent application, 
the United States will amend its laws to satisfY this obligation. 
ARTICLE 2 
Both Governments reaffirm that the principle of territoriality and 
independence of patents with regard to the protection of paten ts as 
provided in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property should be respected. 
The Chinese Government agrees to provide administrative protec-
tion to U.S. pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical product in-
ventions which: 
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(l) were not subject to protection by exclusive rights prior to the 
amendment of current Chinese laws; 
(2) are subject to an exclusive right to prohibit others from mak-
ing, using or selling it in the United States which were granted 
after January 1,1986 and before January 1,1993; 
(3) have not been marketed in China. 
ARTICLE 4 
1. For the purpose of ensuring effective protection against unfair 
competition as provided for in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Chinese Government 
will prevent trade secrets from being disclosed to, acquired by, or 
used by others without the consent of the trade secret owner in a 
manner contrary to honest commercial practices including the ac-
quisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets by third parties who 
knew, or had reasonable grounds to know, that such practices were 
involved in the acquisition of such information. 
2. The term of protection for trade secrets shall continue so long as 
the conditions for protection are met. 
3. The competent authorities of the Chinese Government will sub-
mit the bill necessary to provide the levels of protection specified in 
this Article to its legislative body by July 1, 1993 and will exert its 
best efforts to enact and implement this bill before January 1,1994. 
